In a move that reshapes the regional energy equation, the Netanyahu government has publicly proposed a major shift in the sequencing of the Greece–Cyprus–Israel (GSI) electricity interconnection project. Israel proposes ‘Plan B’ for the Power Cable — Cyprus–Israel section first.
For the first time, Israel has suggested that the Cyprus–Israel segment be prioritised ahead of the Crete–Cyprus connection, effectively setting a new course for the long-delayed cable initiative — one that Athens and Nicosia must now address.
The issue, reportedly discussed during bilateral meetings at the Zappeion Transatlantic Energy Partnership Conference (P-TEC), was highlighted by Israeli Energy Minister Eli Cohen in an interview with Kathimerini. “At present, the plan is for the Crete–Cyprus line to be built first, followed by Cyprus–Israel. Perhaps we should consider reversing the order and begin with the Israel–Cyprus interconnection to save time,” Cohen said.
Cohen’s comments, made shortly after participating in the 3+1 energy ministerial meeting (Greece, Cyprus, Israel + the United States), appear aimed at signalling Israel’s frustration with the project’s persistent delays — driven both by Cyprus’s regulatory and financial indecision and Greece’s hesitation to issue NAVTEX notices in the eastern Mediterranean due to Turkey’s aggressive stance in the region.
A complicated landscape for Greece and Cyprus
Although the European Commission has recently taken a more active role in coordinating the cable’s progress, Israel’s new proposal complicates matters further. Accepting such a shift would, politically, be difficult for both Athens and Nicosia, as it would implicitly acknowledge their inability to advance the Crete–Cyprus section — the project’s original backbone.
From a technical perspective, the Cyprus–Israel link remains far less developed. Both nations’ energy regulators would need to start new cost–benefit analyses (CBA) from scratch, and tender processes would have to be redesigned.
Background and implications
This is not Israel’s first attempt to isolate the Cyprus–Israel leg of the interconnection. Following a May 2025 meeting between Prime Ministers Netanyahu and Christodoulides, Israel proposed integrating the section into the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) — a mega infrastructure initiative backed by Washington as a counterweight to China’s Belt and Road strategy. The argument then, as now, was that linking the project to IMEC would elevate its strategic significance in American eyes.
However, this marks the first time Israel has formally and publicly proposed reprioritising the order of construction, placing the Cyprus–Israel section at the forefront. The move forces both Greece and Cyprus to clarify whether they view this as a viable path forward — or as a shift that undermines their regional leadership in Eastern Mediterranean energy integration.
Cohen’s remarks come just days after the P-TEC meetings in Athens, where he held direct talks with Greek Energy Minister Stavros Papastavrou, Cyprus’s George Papanastasiou, and US Deputy Assistant Secretary Chris Wright. According to reports, the idea of starting from the shorter, 300-kilometre Cyprus–Israel segment was informally raised during those talks, though no formal decision was reached.
Turkey’s shadow and regional stakes
Israel’s intervention underscores growing impatience with regional obstacles — particularly Turkey’s repeated attempts to block or intimidate survey and cable-laying operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. Ankara’s actions have already deterred maritime activity in contested waters, delaying both planning and construction.
By advancing its “Plan B”, Jerusalem signals that it is prepared to act pragmatically to accelerate the project, potentially bypassing regional bottlenecks. For Athens and Nicosia, however, the question remains: can they endorse a shift that may be seen as sidelining the Greek link, or will they risk further delay to preserve political balance?
Either way, the GSI/EuroAsia Interconnector — a project linking Israel’s power grid to Europe through Cyprus and Greece — once again finds itself at the heart of both energy diplomacy and geopolitical tension in the Eastern Mediterranean.
